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Abstract
The article provides a detailed and up-to-date assessment of the contribution of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) to the development of International Environmental Law (IEL), includ-
ing the potential in this respect of the cases currently pending before the Court. The author argues
that the ICJ’s contribution to IEL can be organized in two main waves of cases. The legacy of the
first wave, which covered essentially the Corfu Channel and the Nuclear Tests cases, as well as
an important obiter dictum made in the Barcelona Traction case, was the confirmation of previous
case-law on transboundary damages as well as the introduction of the concept of obligations erga
omnes, potentially applicable to some environmental norms. The second wave, constituted mainly
by the Nauru and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros cases, the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nu-
clear Weapons, and a number of separate/dissenting opinions, was important in consolidating the
previous achievements and pointing to a number of interconnections between IEL and other sub-
fields of international law such as boundary delimitation and international humanitarian law. In
this context, the Pulp Mills and Aerial Herbicides cases, currently pending before the ICJ, could
potentially pave the way for a third wave, providing much needed clarifications of issues such as
the specific contents of IEL as well as the hierarchy and enforceability of its principles.
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INTRODUCTION
In an article written in 1996, at the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ" or
the "Court"), Professor Malgosia Fitzmaurice perceptively noted
that "compared to other subjects... [environmental protection]
... has been perhaps, at least until recently, rather less evident in
the records of the Court."1 Fitzmaurice's observation, particu-
larly her welcoming of the fresh opportunities then presented to
the ICJ to clarify a number of issues of international environ-
mental law ("IEL"), was very understandable. At that moment,
the Court had recently established a Special Environmental
Chamber2 in light of the increasingly environment-related con-
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Po Paris), LL.M. (Harvard Law School), D.E.A. in Public International Law / licence in
International Relations (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva), D.E.A. in
Political Theory / licence in Political Science (University of Geneva), licenciatus juris
(University of Fribourg). Jorge E. Vifiuales is a practicing international lawyer in Ge-
neva as well as the Executive Director of the Latin American Society of International
Law.
1. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Environmental Protection and the International Court ofJustice,
in FIF-YEARs OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROB-
ERT JENNINGS 293 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, The International Court ofJustice and International
Environmental Law, 2 AsiAN Y.B. Irr'L L. 1 (1992).
2. The Chamber for Environmental Matters was created in July 1993, on the basis
of Article 26(1) of the Court's Statute, which states, "[t]he Court may from time to time
form one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges as the Court may
determine, for dealing with particular categories of cases; for example, labour cases and
cases relating to transit and communications." See Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 26(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1058; see generally Press Release 93/20,
International Court ofJustice, Constitution of a Chamber of the Court for the Environ-
mental Matters (July 19, 1993), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/7/
10307.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2008). On the ICJ's experience in the creation of special
chambers, see Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, The Use of Chambers of the International Court of
Justice, in FirY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYs IN HONOUR OF
SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 503 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996). For a
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tent of the cases submitted to it.3 It had further been requested
by the UN General Assembly ("GA") 4 and the World Health Or-
ganization ("WHO") 5 to issue an Advisory Opinion potentially
raising issues relating to the scope of international environmen-
tal norms with respect to the threat and use of nuclear weapons.6
Although part of the potential of these opportunities was
eventually reduced by subsequent developments,7 one should
not underestimate the contribution made by the ICJ to IEL dur-
ing the 1990s. Arguably, the ICJ's main contribution was embod-
ied in its Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996 on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,' as well as in some of the declara-
tions/opinions appended to it by the members of the Court,
above all that of Judge Weeramantry.9 Judge Weeramantry fur-
ther discussed environmental issues in two other dissenting opin-
ions, one in the context of the Request for an Examination of the
discussion of the ICJ's Environmental Chamber and more generally of the need for an
international environmental court, see ELLEN HEY, REFLECTIONS ON AN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COURT 1-25 (2000).
3. The press release announcing the creation of the Chamber expressly stated
that, "[a] t present, out of eleven cases in its docket, the full Court is seised of two cases,
namely those concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.) and the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) with important implications for interna-
tional law on matters relating to the environment." Press Release 93/20 supra note 2, at
1.
4. See generally G.A. Res. 49/75[K], U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/75 (Dec. 15, 1994); Press
Release 94/24, International Court ofJustice, The General Assembly of the United Na-
tions Requests an Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons (Dec. 23, 1994), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/10359.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
5. See Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons, WHA Res. 46.40,
World Health Assembly, 46th Assembly, 13th plen. mtg., at 2 (May 14, 1993); see also
Press Release 93/30, International Court of Justice, Request by the WHO for an Advi-
sory Opinion (Sept. 13, 1993), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/
10317.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
6. These issues were raised in the submissions made to the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ" or the "Court") by a number of States.
7. Of the two cases mentioned that had partly motivated the creation of a Special
Environmental Chamber one was settled. See generally Certain Phosphate Lands in Na-
uru (Nauru v. Ausfl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13). Moreover, the Special Environmental
Chamber was never put to use and in 2006, after thirteen years, it was eventually de-
cided that it would not be reconstituted. As for the Advisory Opinions requested by the
World Health Organization ("WHO") and the General Assembly ("GA"), the Court
only admitted the request introduced by the latter, dismissing the WHO's request as
exceeding the scope of its mandate. See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 266 (July 8).
8. See generally id.
9. See id. at 429 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
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Situation introduced by New Zealand in relation to the Nuclear Tests
case10 and the other in the context of the boundary delimitation
in the case concerning the Kasikili/Sedudu Island." These devel-
opments alone would warrant renewed attention to the ICJ's
contribution to IEL.12 But that is not all.
More than a decade after the seminal study by Professor
Fitzmaurice, the ICJ is again presented with an opportunity to
clarify some important issues of IEL through two pending con-
tentious cases. The first of these cases, Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.),'3 was instituted on May 6, 2006, and op-
poses Argentina to Uruguay, in connection with the construc-
tion of two pulp mills on the banks of the River Uruguay facing
the Argentine town of Gualeguaychti. Argentina claims, among
others, that these mills will, "damage the environment of the
River Uruguay and its area of influence zone," affecting a large
part of the local population concerned by the "significant risks
of pollution of the river, deterioration of biodiversity, harmful
effects on health and damage to fisheries resources," and the
"extremely serious consequences for tourism and other eco-
nomic interests."' 4 The second case, Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ec-
uador v. Colom.), 5 instituted by Ecuador on April 1, 2008, con-
cerns the aerial spraying by Colombia of toxic herbicides at loca-
tions near, at and across Colombia's border with Ecuador.
Ecuador claims, among others, that such conduct has "caused
10. See generally Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.Cj. 253 (Dec. 20); Nuclear
Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20); see also Request for an Examination of the
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December
1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 319-63 (Sept. 22) (Weera-
mantry, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Nuclear Tests II].
11. See Kasikili/Sedudu (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1153 (Dec. 13) (Weera-
mantry, J., dissenting).
12. For an assessment conducted by the end of the 1990s, see Alexandre-Charles
Kiss, The International Court of Justice and the Protection of the Environment, 11 HAGUE Y.B.
IINT'L L. 1, 1-13 (1998).
13. See generally Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Application of May
4, 2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/10779.pdf (last visited
Oct. 3, 2008).
14. Press Release 2006/17, International Court ofJustice, Argentina Institutes Pro-
ceedings Against Uruguay and Requests the Court to Indicate Provisional Measures,
para. 5 (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=
1010&pt=l&pl=6&p2=1.
15. See generally Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.) (Application of
Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/138/14474.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 3, 2008).
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serious damage to people, to crops, to animals, and to the natu-
ral environment on the Ecuadorian side of the frontier, and
poses a grave risk of further damage over time. ' 16 Whereas the
Aerial Herbicide case is only starting, the Pulp Mills case is already
well advanced. Uruguay's Rejoinder on the Merits was due on
July 29, 2008.17 In light of the information publicly available,
one may therefore expect one or perhaps two ICJ decisions on
important topics of IEL in the coming years.
Against this background, it seems pertinent to devote re-
newed attention to the contribution of the ICJ to IEL, taking
into account the Court's previous case-law relating to this field as
well as the potential of the issues currently pending before it. In
this regard, after some brief general observations (Part I), this
Article examines the main contribution of the two main "waves"
of cases decided by the ICJ involving environmental matters
(Parts II & III), before turning to the potential of the cases cur-
rently pending before it for the development of IEL (Part IV).
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
One may distinguish, for analytical purposes, two main
trends or "waves" of cases in the ICJ jurisprudence relating to
IEL. The first wave covers essentially two contentious cases,
namely the Corfu Channel case (U.K. v. Alb.)"8 and the Nuclear
Tests case,'" as well as an important obiter dictum made in the Bar-
celona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited case (Beig. v.
Spain).2" The main contribution of this wave is to be found in
the confirmation of previous case law on transboundary dam-
ages as well as in the introduction of the concept of obligations
erga omnes, potentially applicable to some environmental norms.
16. See Press Release 2008/05, International Court of Justice, Ecuador Institutes
Proceedings Against Colombia with Regard to a Dispute Concerning the Alleged Aerial
Spraying by Colombia of Toxic Herbicides over Ecuadorian Territory, para. 2 (Apr. 1,
2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/138/14470.pdf (last visited Oct.
3, 2008).
17. See generally Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Order of Sept. 14,
2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/14051.pdf (last visited Oct.
3, 2008).
18. See generally Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
19. See generally Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), surpa note 10; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v.
Fr.), supra note 10.
20. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (BeIg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
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As will be discussed, these two components set the basis in gen-
eral international law for the protection against environmental
damage caused to states and to the environment as such, outside
the jurisdiction of any state.
The second wave is embodied in two contentious cases,
namely Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia)2
and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),2 2 which both
prompted the constitution of a Special Environmental Chamber
of the ICJ, one Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons,23 and a number of separate/dissenting
opinions, particularly those of Judge Weeramantry in the afore-
mentioned Advisory Opinion as well as in the context of the
Kasikili/Sedudu and the Nuclear Tests II cases. 24 This second wave
was important in that it consolidated the previous case law and
pointed to a number of interconnections between IEL, on the
one hand, and both boundary delimitation and international
humanitarian law, on the other hand. In other words, what the
first wave prepared was confirmed and extended by the second.
To these two waves, one could potentially add a third one,
covering the Pulp Mills and Aerial Herbicide cases currently pend-
ing before the Court.25 With respect to these cases, however,
one can only attempt to circumscribe a number of issues left
open by the second wave that the ICJ will hopefully clarify in its
forthcoming decisions.
II. THE FIRST WAVE: THE TWO PILLARS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The initial conception underlying the protection of the en-
vironment was narrow and focused on the consequences of
transboundary injury, as opposed to the idea of the environment
21. See generally Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), supra note 7.
22. See generally Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept.
25).
23. See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opin-
ion, supra note 7.
24. See id. at 502-04 (July 8) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Bots. v. Namib.), supra note 11, at 1184, 91-92 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); Nu-
clear Tests II, supra note 10, at 319-63 (Sept. 22) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
25. See generally Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urn.) (Application of May
4, 2006), supra note 13; Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.) (Application of
Mar. 31, 2008), supra note 15.
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as an international common good to be preserved by all states. 26
The origins of this conception are usually illustrated with refer-
ence to two well-known cases, namely the Trail Smelter Arbitration
(U.S. v. Can.)27 and the Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.). 21
Before discussing how the ICJ came initially to uphold this nar-
row conception, it may be useful to briefly recall the legacy of
these two cases.
In the Trail Smelter case, the tribunal had to decide whether
Canada was responsible for damage caused to the crops and
lands of the State of Washington by the sulphur dioxide emis-
sions stemming from a Canadian smelter of zinc and lead ores,
based in British Columbia, Canada.29 In its decision of March
11, 1941, the tribunal held that:
[U] nder the principles of international law, as well as the law
of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.3"
On this basis, the tribunal held Canada responsible for the dam-
age caused by the Canadian smelter and granted compensation
to the United States. 1 Some fifteen years later, another arbitral
tribunal deciding a transboundary dispute between France and
Spain relating to the use of the waters of Lake Lanoux, endorsed
again the narrow conception of environmental protection:
The Spanish government has also sought to establish the con-
tents of contemporary positive international law .... Certain
principles that it seeks to demonstrate are, assuming it suc-
ceeds, without relevance for the issue under review. Thus, as-
suming there is a principle prohibiting the upstream State
from altering the waters of a river in such a way as to seriously
harm the downstream State, in any event such principle
would not apply in the present case, to the extent that it has
26. SeeJochen Sohnle, Irruption du droit de 1'environnement dans la jurisprudence de la
C.I.J.: l'affaire Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, in 102 REVUE GtNRALE DE DROIT IN-T'L PUB. 85, 86
(1998).
27. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS ("R.I.A.A.")
1905 (1941).
28. Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 285 (1963).
29. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), supra note 27, at 1963.
30. Id.
31. See generally id.
2008]
238 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:232
been admitted by the Tribunal . . . that the French project
does not alter the waters of the river Carol. In fact, States are
nowadays perfectly aware of the importance of the contradic-
tory interests involved in the industrial use of international
watercourses, and of the need to reconcile them through mu-
tual concessions. The only way to achieve such interest com-
promises is the conclusion of agreements, on an increasingly
comprehensive basis.32
This latter paragraph provides a good illustration of the fact
that, at the time, it was still very much unclear whether environ-
mental protection was required as such, i.e., for the sole sake of
the environment as a common resource, or rather only to the
extent another state was damaged by a given conduct.33 It
seems, in fact, very difficult to infer from either one of these two
cases the idea that the environment has an intrinsic value that
must be protected irrespective of whether or not a state is in-
jured.
The decision of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case came as a
confirmation of this narrow view, stated in more general terms.
It is noteworthy, however, that the Corfu Channel case was not
concerned with any environmental issue. Its relevance for IEL
stems from the fact that it provided a factual background al-
lowing for the principle initially asserted in the Trail Smelter case
to be confirmed and linked to general international law. In-
32. See Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), supra note 28, at 308 (1963) (author's
translation). The original French text says:
[L]e Gouvernement espagnol s'est efforc6 d'6tablir 6galement le contenu du
droit international positif actuel .. . Certains principes dont il fait la demon-
stration sont, a supposer celle-ci acquise, sans intert pour le problme actuel-
lement examin6. Ainsi, en admettant qu'il existe un principe interdisant A
l'Etat d'amont d'altfrer les eaux d'un fleuve dans des conditions de nature A
nuire gravement A l'Etat d'aval, un tel principe ne trouve pas son application A
la pr~sente espfce, puisqu'il a 6t6 admis par le Tribunal . . .que le projet
franais n'altire pas les eaux du Carol. En realit6, les Etats ont aujourd'hui
parfaitement conscience de l'importance des intirets contradictoires, que met
en cause l'utilisation industrielle des fleuves internationaux, et de la n~cessit6
de les concilier les uns avec les autres par des concessions mutuelles. La seule
voie pour aboutir A ces compromis d'int6r& est la conclusion d'accords, sur
une base de plus en plus comprehensive.
See id.
33. Antonio Cassese points, in this regard, to the fact that the arbitral tribunal did
allude "to the possibility of natural resources such as the water of a lake being exploited
'in the common interests of everybody."' ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 377
(2001).
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deed, the Court grounded the obligations breached by the Alba-
nian authorities not on any specific treaty or convention but on
general international law:
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities
consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general,
the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and
in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent
danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obliga-
tions are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No.
VIII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain gen-
eral and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary con-
siderations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in
war; the principle of the freedom of maritime communica-
tion; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.3 4
The impact of this latter assertion should not be underesti-
mated. It embodies a principle that, as far as IEL is concerned,35
underlies some of the founding instruments of IEL, such as the
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 36 or
the work of the International Law Commission on the Interna-
tional Liability of States for the Injurious Consequences of Acts
Not Prohibited by International Law.3 7  Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration states, indeed, that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own en-
vironmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that ac-
tivities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
34. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), supra note 18, at 22 (emphasis added).
35. The principle has also had a lasting impact on other fields, such as the interna-
tional responsibility of States for wrongful acts or international investment law. Regard-
ing the first, see Luigi Condorelli, L imputation d l'tat d'un fait internationalement illicite:
solutions classiques et nouvelles tendences, 189 RECUEIL DES CoUs 9 (1984-VI). As to the
second field, see, e.g., Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/
87/3, Final Award, 4 ICSID Rep. 245 (June 27, 1990).
36. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declara-
tion of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1,
(June 16, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declara-
tion].
37. On the evolution of the work of the International Law Commission ("ILC") to
explore this topic with an increased focus on environmental issues, see generally Alan
E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 I,-T'L & Comip. L.Q. 1 (1990).
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age to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.3 8
Principle 21, however, goes further than the principle asserted
in the Corfu Channel case in that it expressly refers to "damage to
the environment... of areas beyond the limits of national juris-
diction. '' "9 As seen before, it is difficult to infer the legal ground-
ing of such an addition from previous case law.4"
This issue could have been clarified two years later in the
Nuclear Tests case. In this case, the then Solicitor-General for
Australia, RJ. Ellicott, asserted the existence of an emerging rule
of customary international law prohibiting nuclear tests by refer-
ence to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.4' However,
the case was eventually settled and the ICJ did not address the
matter. Thus the question of the customary status of the addi-
tion made by the Stockholm Declaration remained open. More-
over, the appended opinions of Judges Petrfn and de Castro re-
flected opposite stances on this issue.42 From these opinions, it
is at best possible to infer that, if a customary norm did exist, it
would be limited to transboundary pollution, that is, to the pro-
tection of the environment to the extent that such protection is
necessary to avoid damage to a state.4 3
38. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 36, princ. 21, at 1420.
39. See id. at 1426.
40. Older case law has, in fact, expressly rejected this argument. In the Pacific Fur
Seal Arbitration (U.S. v. UK.), reprinted in 1 J.B. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PARTY 801 (1898), the
arbitral tribunal had to decide whether the United States had "'any right.., of protec-
tion or property in the fur seals frequenting the islands of the United States in Behring
Sea when such seals are found outside the ordinary three-mile limit [outside the territo-
rial sea]."' CASSESE, supra note 33, at 376 (quoting 1 MOORE, supra, at 801). Cassese
further refers to a note sent by the U.S. Secretary of State to France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, Sweden and Norway, stating among others that, "'It is
well known that the unregulated and indiscriminate killing of seals in many parts of the
world has driven them from place to place, and, by breaking up their habitual resorts,
has gready reduced their number ....' CASSESE, supra note 33, at 376 n.2 (quoting 1
MOORE, supra, at 801). The Tribunal, however, rejected the arguments of the United
States and held that the United States had no right of protection or property in the fur-
seals.
41. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. Pleadings 163, 185-87 (May 21, 1973),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/58/9445.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
42. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 1, at 299.
43. In his dissenting opinion, Judge de Castro notes, in particular, that:
[T] he Applicant's complaint against France of violation of its sovereignty by
introducing harmful matter into its territory without its permission is based on
a legal interest which has been well known since the time of Roman law. The
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With this context in mind, it is easier to understand why the
work undertaken by the International Law Commission on Inter-
national Liability in 1978"4 was to focus on transboundary envi-
ronmental harm.45 As noted by a prominent commentator:
When the matter reached its agenda as a separate item, how-
ever, the Commission avoided exclusive identification with
environmental protection, and sought rules of a more gen-
eral nature, which could also include forms of harm arising
out of economic or monetary activities .... It quickly became
apparent, however, that the precedents on which the Com-
mission would have to rely came exclusively from the environ-
prohibition of immissio (of water, smoke, fragments of stone) into a
neighbouring property was a feature of Roman Law .. . The principle sic
utere tuo ut aliaenum non laedas is a feature of law both ancient and modern
.... In international law, the duty of each State not to use its territory for acts
contrary to the rights of other States might be mentioned (LC.J. Reports 1949,
p. 22). The arbitral awards of 16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941 given in a
dispute between the United States and Canada mention the lack of precedents
as to pollution of the air, but also the analogy with pollution of water .... If it
is admitted as a general rule that there is a right to demand prohibition of the
emission by neighbouring properties of noxious fumes, the consequence must
be drawn, by an obvious analogy, that the Applicant is entitled to ask the Court
to uphold its claim that France should put an end to the deposit of radio-
active fall-out on its territory.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 388-89 (Dec. 20) (de Castro,J., dissenting).
Thus, the reasoning is limited to those damages to the environment resulting in dam-
ages to a particular State. The more general question of damages to the environment
irrespective of damages to a given State is discussed by Judge de Castro from the stand-
point of "infringement of the principle of freedom of the high seas as the result of
restrictions on navigation and flying due to the establishment of forbidden zones" as
distinct from norms of environmental protection. Id. at 390. In any case, it is significant
that Judge de Castro seems to resume with the narrow conception of environmental
protection when he notes, "[i]t seems to me that this third complaint is not admissible
in the form in which it has been presented. The Applicant is not relying on a right of
its own disputed by France, and does not base its Application on any material injury,
responsibility for which it is prepared to prove lies upon France." Id.
44. See International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Thirtieth Session, 170-78, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt. 2, at 1, 149, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1.
45. For a detailed account of the evolution of this topic at the ILC see the ILC's
Analytical Guide, see generally U.N. CODIFICATION DIVISION, OFlCE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,
ANALYrICAL GUIDE TO THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION, 1949-1997
(1998), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/9.htm. See also Julio Barboza, In-
ternational Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law
and Protection of the Environment, 247 RECUEIL DES Couas 291, 291-405 (1994); Julio
Barboza, La Responsabilitj (causale) d la Commission du Droit International, 34 ANNUAIRE
FRANCAS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) 513,
513-22 (1988).
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mental field or dealt only with physical transboundary
harm.4
6
In the meantime, however, the ICJ had taken a step the im-
portance of which, both for IEL and for other sub-fields of inter-
national law, would only become clear many years later. Indeed,
in a now famous obiter dictum included in its decision of February
5, 1970, in the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ noted that some
international obligations had an erga omnes effect, in that "all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection. '4 7
As in the Corfu Channel case, the Court did not refer explicitly to
environmental matters. But the potential of such an assertion
for the development of norms relating to the protection of the
environment irrespective of any specific harm caused to a state
46. See Boyle, supra note 37, at 3-4. In the twelfth and last report presented by the
former Special Rapporteur, Prof. Julio Barboza, at the ILC's 48th session in 1996, it was
recalled that: "[T]wo complete reports of the Special Rapporteur have yet to be consid-
ered: the tenth report, which concerns harm to the environment, and the eleventh,
which proposes a liability regime for cases of transboundary harm," adding that,
"[a)lthough it is true that harm to the environment is an interesting item, it is also true
that, basically, the Commission need only determine what this category comprises, since
it has already agreed in principle that the concept of harm should include harm to the
environment." The Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, Twelfth Report
on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by Inter-
national Law, 6, 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/475 (May 13, 1996). Thereafter, the work on
this topic was split in two, namely "prevention of transboundary damages from hazard-
ous activities" and "international liability in case of loss from transboundary harm aris-
ing out of hazardous activities," and a new Special Rapporteur was appointed, in the
person of Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao. This approach resulted in two sets of draft arti-
cles, the Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Ac-
tivities (International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Prevention of Trans-
boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://untreaty.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9-7-2001.pdf [hereinafter Draft
on Prevention]) and the Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in Case of Trans-
boundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities (International Law Commission,
Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising
Out of Hazardous Activities, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_10J2006.pdf [hereinafter Draft on
Loss]). The conception underlying both Drafts is a narrow one, as reflected in the
definition of "transboundary harm" as "harm caused in the territory of or in other
places under the jurisdiction or control of a State other than the State of origin,
whether or not the States concerned share a common border" (Draft on Prevention,
supra, art. 2(c)) or of "transboundary damage" as "damage caused to persons, property
or the environment in the territory or in other places under the jurisdiction or control
of a State other than the State of origin." See Draft on Loss, supra, princ. 2(e).
47. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), supra
note 20, at 32.
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cannot be overlooked. Such potential was to be reflected in the
attempt to introduce environmental protection as one of the
counts allowing for the criminal responsibility of states.4" Al-
though this attempt eventually failed, after Article 19 of the pre-
ceding project of Articles on State Responsibility was aban-
doned, it is interesting to note the link made in the Commentary
to that project between environmental norms and the idea of
obligations erga omnes:
More recently, the requirements of economic and social de-
velopment on all sides and the marvelous achievements, but
also the terrible dangers, of scientific and technological pro-
gress have led States to realize the imperative need to protect
the most essential common property of mankind and, in par-
ticular, to safeguard and preserve the human environment
for the benefit of present and future generations. New rules
of international law have thus appeared, others in course of
emergence have become firmly established and yet others, al-
ready existing, have acquired new vigour and more marked
significance; these rules impose upon States obligations
which are to be respected because of an increased collective
interest on the part of the entire international community.49
Thus, the contribution of the first wave of cases is to some
extent ambiguous: (i) on the one hand, the Court made it clear
that there was an obligation on States not to knowingly allow
their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states; such obligation was not explicitly stated with respect to
transboundary environmental harm, as some had hoped in the
context of the Nuclear Tests case, but the combination of the
Trail Smelter award, the ICJ decision in the Corfu Channel case,
and the suggestions of Judge de Castro in his dissenting opinion
in the Nuclear Tests case gave a significant indication that such a
48. Article 19(3) (d) of the Draft Articles provisionally adopted on Second Reading
by the Drafting Committee (1998-2000) stated, "[subject to paragraph 2, and on the
basis of the rules of international law in force, an international crime may result, inter
alia, from.., a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibit-
ing massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas." International Law Commission,
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, art. 19(3)(d), at 125, 131, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
49. See International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Twenty-Eighth Session, 15, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COIMM'N pt. 2, at 115, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.4/1976/Add.1 (Part 2).
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customary obligation was ripe to be asserted; ° (ii) on the other
hand, this development, although of great importance, left aside
the more fundamental idea that the environment deserved pro-
tection per se, irrespective of the potential damage directly suf-
fered by a state. This other necessary component of environ-
mental protection, already spelled out in Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration,5' was to receive indirect support from
the Court through the introduction of the concept of obliga-
tions erga omnes.
Therefore, although the ICJ had not yet elaborated on the
actual contents and scope of environmental protection, its two
underlying components had received, through the Corfu Channel
and the Barcelona Traction decisions, an initial grounding on gen-
eral international law.
III. THE SECOND WAVE: THE SCOPE AND CONTENTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
What the first wave had heralded was consolidated and fur-
ther developed by the second wave of cases. A cautious analysis
of the corpus of decisions and opinions belonging to the second
wave confirms that, not only was the principle asserted in the
Corfu Channel case expressly acknowledged and formulated spe-
cifically with respect to IEL, but in addition the larger compo-
nent of environmental protection was expressly recognized as
part of customary international law. One may add to these fun-
damental contributions of the ICJ, a number of more progres-
sive statements, some of which have, as I shall point out later,
widely influenced the development of international law in areas
such as state responsibility, international humanitarian law or
the international law of development.
As noted in the Introduction, the most important contribu-
tion of the second wave is probably that of the ICJ's Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.52
The Court set out to respond to a very broad question posed by
the GA, namely: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
50. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), supra note 10, at 388-89 (de Castro,J., dissent-
ing).
51. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 36, princ. 21, at 1424.
52. See generally Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opin-
ion, supra note 7.
A CONTEMPORARY ASSESSMENT
circumstance permitted under international law?"' 53 After ad-
dressing its ability to issue such an opinion and clarifying the
scope of the question, the Court turned to the relevant portions
of international law that should be called upon to analyze the
matter. In this context, the Court was led to discuss the rele-
vance of IEL and, before setting aside this body of law as one
which was not part of the "most directly relevant applicable law
governing the question,"54 it made the following important com-
ment:
The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily
threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a
catastrophe for the environment. The Court also recognizes
that the environment is not an abstraction but represents the
living space, the quality of life and the very health of human
beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the gen-
eral obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion and control respect the environment of other States or of areas
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment.
55
It further noted that:
However, the Court is of the view that the issue is not whether
the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are
or are not applicable during an armed conflict, but rather
whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were in-
tended to be obligations of total restraint during military con-
flict.
The Court does not consider that the treaties in question
could have intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its
right of self-defence under international law because of its ob-
ligations to protect the environment. Nonetheless, States must
take environmental considerations into account when assessing what
is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military
objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go
to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of
necessity and proportionality.56
The picture that emerges from the preceding paragraphs is
a rich and complex one. The first point to be noted is that both
53. See id. 1 1 Uuly 8) (citing GA Res. 49/75 K, supra note 4).
54. Id. at 243, 1 34.
55. Id. at 241, 29 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 242, 30 (emphasis added).
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the statal and non-statal components of environmental protec-
tion are expressly acknowledged as "part of the corpus of inter-
national law relating to the environment. '57 Thus, the principle
originally stated in the Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel cases, ac-
cording to which activities within a state's jurisdiction and con-
trol should not damage other states, is re-affirmed by the Court
specifically in the area of environmental protection. Moreover,
the principle that activities within a state's jurisdiction and con-
trol must be respectful of the environment outside national con-
trol, that is, the environment as such, is recognized as part of
international law in ICJ case law for the first time. The acknowl-
edgment of these two principles must however be nuanced.
Indeed-and it is our second point-what the Court actually
says is that such principles (or one principle involving the statal
and non-statal components) "is now part of the corpus of inter-
national law relating to the environment."58 This is not exactly
the same thing as saying that they are part of general interna-
tional law, particularly if one takes into account that, throughout
the paragraphs preceding this assertion, the Court was mostly
concerned with treaty law. This narrow interpretation would be
further reflected in the Court's reference to "the treaties in ques-
tion" one paragraph after. On the other hand, one may note
that, among the instruments discussed in this portion of the
Court's opinion, one finds express mention of Principles 21 and
2 of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, respectively. 59 Thus,
there is ambiguity as to the scope of the Court's assertion in par-
agraph 29 of its Advisory Opinion. This ambiguity did not go
unnoticed by Judge Weeramantry, who in his dissenting opinion,
after referring to a number of substantive principles of IEL,
noted that their validity was not dependent on treaty provisions:
Environmental law incorporates a number of principles
which are violated by nuclear weapons. The principle of in-
tergenerational equity and the common heritage principle
57. Id. at 241, 29.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 241, 1 27 (referring to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. See
supra footnote 51, and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment. U.N. Conference on the Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 Uune 14, 1992), re-
printed in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/
conf1 51 /aconf15126-1 annexl.htm).
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have already been discussed. Other principles of environ-
mental law, which this request enables the Court to recognize
and use in reaching its conclusions, are the precautionary
principle, the principle of trusteeship of earth resources, the
principle that the burden of proving safety lies upon the au-
thor of the act complained of, and, the "polluter pays princi-
ple," placing on the author of environmental damage the
burden of making adequate reparation to those affected.
There have been juristic efforts in recent times to formulate
what have been described as "principles of ecological secur-
ity"-a process of norm creation and codification of environ-
mental law which has developed under the stress of the need
to protect human civilization from the threat of self-destruc-
tion ....
These principles of environmental law thus do not depend for their
validity on treaty provisions. They are part of customary interna-
tional law. They are part of the sine qua non for human sur-
vival.60
This reflects, however, the views of Judge Weeramantry alone,
who has often taken very progressive stances with respect to the
environment. An important question is, therefore, whether one
can find in other decisions of the Court additional elements to
support the view that the statal and non-statal components of
environmental protection are grounded in general international
law. Two other cases seem apposite in this regard, namely the
Nuclear Tests II and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros cases.6" Regarding the
first, in its Order of September 22, 2005 relative to the request
for an examination of the situation, the ICJ had observed, before
dismissing New Zealand's application, that the Order was:
[W] ithout prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and pro-
tect the natural environment, obligations to which both New Zea-
land and France have in the present instance reaffirmed their
commitment.
62
The general character of the phrase in italics suggests that these
obligations, which are not specified, belong to each and every
60. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra
note 7, at 502-04 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
61. See generally Nuclear Tests II, supra note 10; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung./Slovk.), supra note 22.
62. See Nuclear Tests I1, supra note 10, at 306 (emphasis added).
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state, irrespective of their having signed a particular treaty.63
The ICJ's remarks in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case tend to con-
firm the customary nature of at least part of IEL, again, without
referring to any specific norm:
The Court has no difficulty in acknowledging that the con-
cerns expressed by Hungary for its natural environment in
the region affected by the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project re-
lated to an "essential interest" of that State, within the mean-
ing given to that expression in Article 33 of the Draft of the
International Law Commission ....
Neither of the Parties contended that new peremptory norms
of environmental law had emerged since the conclusion of
the 1977 Treaty, and the Court will consequently not be re-
quired to examine the scope of Article 64 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties. On the other hand, the
Court wishes to point out that newly developed norms of envi-
ronmental law are relevant for the implementation of the
Treaty and that the parties could, by agreement, incorporate
them through the application of Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the
Treaty. These articles do not contain specific obligations of
performance but require the parties, in carrying out their ob-
ligations to ensure that the quality of water in the Danube is
not impaired and that nature is protected, to take new envi-
ronmental norms into consideration when agreeing upon the
means to be specified in the Joint Contractual Plan.64
Confirmation of the customary nature of at least part of IEL is
given here in three ways. It is first acknowledged that environ-
63. It should be recalled, in this regard, that New Zealand had invoked in support
of its application not only treaty provisions but also customary international law:
In its "Request for an Examination of the Situation" New Zealand contends
that, both by virtue of specific treaty undertakings (in the Convention for the
Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific
Region of 25 November 1986 or "Noumea Convention") and customary inter-
national law derived from widespread international practice, France has an
obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment before carrying
out any further nuclear tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa; and it further con-
tends that France's conduct is illegal in that it causes, or is likely to cause, the
introduction into the marine environment of radioactive material, France be-
ing under an obligation, before carrying out its new underground nuclear
tests, to provide evidence that they will not result in the introduction of such
material to that environment, in accordance with the "precautionary princi-
ple" very widely accepted in contemporary international law.
Id. at 290, 1 5.
64. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), supra note 22, at 41, 67, 11 53,
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mental interests may amount to "essential interests" in the mean-
ing of the customary rule providing for the state of necessity de-
fense. While an interest is conceptually different from a norm,
the existence of a legally protected interest assumes that such
interest has legal relevance irrespective (in this case) of any
treaty. Second, the Court speaks of "newly developed norms of
environmental law .. .relevant for the implementation of the
Treaty."65 This seems a clear reference to norms belonging to
international customary law. Third, and perhaps more tellingly,
in order to buttress its conclusion that environmental interests
can in fact amount to "essential interests," the Court expressly
refers to paragraph 29 of its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, thus suggesting that the "gen-
eral obligation" mentioned in paragraph 29 had the same basis
as the essential character of environmental protection. Thus, all
in all, it seems possible to infer from these observations made by
the Court that the statal and non-statal components of environ-
mental protection enjoy a customary grounding.
A third point to be noted is the interconnection mentioned
by the Court in paragraph 30 of its Opinion between environ-
mental protection and international humanitarian law.66 It is in-
teresting to see that the Court was in some way inaugurating a
fuller understanding of the potential ramifications of IEL as part
of general international law. In this particular case, the inter-
connection was analyzed through the lens of the requirements
of necessity and proportionality. As pointed out by Michael
Matheson, such interconnection means that:
[E]lements of the natural environment cannot be made the
object of attack, unless their destruction would give direct
military advantage in the particular circumstances in ques-
tion, which seems a rare situation. It [also] means that an
attack cannot be made if the risk of collateral damage to the
environment is disproportionate to the direct military advan-
tage of the attack. These principles apply to both nuclear
and conventional attacks that may cause environmental dam-
age.
67
65. See id. at 67, 112.
66. On this interconnection, see generally Michael J. Matheson, The Environmental
Effects of Nuclear Weapons and the 1996 World Court Opinion, 25 VT. L. REv. 773 (2001).
67. Id. at 776; see generally Neil A.F. Popovic, Humanitarian Law, Protection of the
Environment, and Human Rights, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 67 (1995); Yoram Dinstein,
2008]
250 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:232
In addition to international humanitarian law, the jurisprudence
of the ICJ points to other interconnections between IEL and a
sub-field of international law. Thus, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
case, the Court referred, for instance, to the interactions be-
tween economic development and the preservation of the envi-
ronment:
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other
reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this
was often done without consideration of the effects upon the
environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a grow-
ing awareness of the risks for mankind-for present and fu-
ture generations-of pursuit of such interventions at an un-
considered and unabated pace, new norms and standards
have been developed, set forth in a great number of instru-
ments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to
be taken into consideration, and such new standards given
proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activi-
ties but also when continuing with activities begun in the past.
This need to reconcile economic development with protec-
tion of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of
sustainable development.
68
In his Separate Opinion appended in this same case, 9 Judge
Weeramantry gave his views on the hierarchy between the two
fields, and the rights and obligations that may result from such
hierarchy, namely a right to development (conditioned by the
protection of the environment),7" a "human right" to the protec-
tion of the environment,7 1 and a duty of environmental impact
Protection of the Environment in International Armed Conflict, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED
NATIONS L. 523 (2001).
68. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), supra note 22, at 78, 1 140.
69. Id. at 92, 112, 114 (separate opinion of Weeramantry, J.).
70. On the concept of sustainable development in public international law, see
generally Astrid Epiney & Martin Scheyli, Le concept de dveloppement durable en droit inter-
national public, 7 REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT EUROPtEN 247
(1997). On the origins of this concept, see generally Peter H. Sand, International Envi-
ronmental Law After Rio, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 377 (1993).
71. On this much discussed and controversial issue see, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AP-
PROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds.,
1996); A. A. Caniado Trindade, The Contribution of International Human Rights Law to
Environmental Protection, with Special Reference to Global Environmental Change, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 244
(Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and
the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Right
of the Child to a Clean Environment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 611 (1999); Sueli Giorgetta, TheRight
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assessment and monitoring:
After the early formulations of the concept of development, it
has been recognized that development cannot be pursued to
such a point as to result in substantial damage to the environ-
ment within which it is to occur. Therefore development can
only be prosecuted in harmony with the reasonable demands
of environmental protection. Whether development is sus-
tainable by reason of its impact on the environment will, of
course, be a question to be answered in the context of the
particular situation involved.
It is thus the correct formulation of the right to development
that that right does not exist in the absolute sense, but is rela-
tive always to its tolerance by the environment. The right to
development as thus refined is clearly part of the modem in-
ternational law. It is compendiously referred to as sustainable
development ....
Environmental law in its current state of development would
read into treaties which may reasonably be considered to
have a significant impact upon the environment, a duty of
environmental impact assessment and this means also,
whether the treaty expressly so provides or not, a duty of
monitoring the environmental impacts of any substantial pro-
ject during the operation of the scheme ....
Environmental rights are human rights. Treaties that affect
human rights cannot be applied in such a manner as to con-
stitute a denial of human rights as understood at the time of
their application. A Court cannot endorse actions which are
a violation of human rights by the standards of their time
merely because they are taken under a treaty which dates
back to a period when such action was not a violation of
human rights.
7 9
In another Dissenting Opinion, this time in the context of the
Kasikili/Sedudu case, Judge Weeramantry also stressed the impact
of environmental protection on boundary delimitation, to the
extent that a Court proceeding to such a delimitation should, in
his opinion, take into account the interests of the ecosystem and
even seek solutions deviating from a geometric path set in a
boundary treaty:
to a Healthy Environment, Human Rights and Sustainable Development, 2 INT'L EN,'rL. AGREE-
,NIEINrs: POL. L. & ECON. 173 (1999); Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights?
A Reassessment, 18 FORDHAm ENVTL. L. REV. 471 (2007).
72. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), supra note 22, at 92, 112, 114
(separate opinion of Weeramantry, J.).
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If there is a natural reserve which, in the interests of the
ecosystem and of biological diversity cannot be divided with-
out lasting damage, this is a factor which the Court can no
less ignore than a sacred site or archaeological preserve
which must be maintained in its integrity if it is to be pre-
served.
There is more than one way in which equitable considera-
tions can be given effect in such situations.
One is that the Court should consider itself empowered to
make a slight deviation from the strict geometric path indi-
cated by the boundary treaty, but always preserving a balance
between the entitlements of the two parties to the enjoyment
of this precious asset.
Another is to constitute, in the larger interests of both parties
and indeed of the world community, a joint regime over the
area so that neither party is deprived of its use. In this cate-
gory, a multitude of possibilities and precedents are available
which I shall briefly consider later.
73
The extent to which such an argument can be followed remains
unclear. It was already discussed, although in a somewhat differ-
ent version, and set aside by the ICJ in Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area"4 in relation to the existence of
a natural maritime boundary. One may, however, consider that
such an argument is and will be increasingly relevant at least in
the area of equitable boundary delimitation.75
73. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), supra note 11, at 1184, 1 91-92
(Dec. 13) (Weeramantry,J., dissenting).
74. See generally Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
75. As noted by Fitzmaurice, however:
The Chamber did not go so far as to deny that a delimitation line could follow
a discernible natural boundary; but it stated that, in the case under considera-
tion, there were no geological, geomorphological, ecological or other factors
sufficiently important, evident or conclusive to represent a single, incontro-
vertible natural boundary.
Fitzmaurice, supra note 1 at 300; see also Barbara Kwiatkowska, Economic and Environmen-
tal Considerations, in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 75-113 (jonathan I. Charney
& Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993); Barbara Kwiatkowska, Equitable Maritime Boundary
Delimitation, in FIFrvYEA.s OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE: EssAYs IN HONOUR
OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 264-92 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
The environmental argument was further discussed in other cases of maritime delimita-
tion, although essentially from the standpoint of the Parties' access to the resources
rather than the protection of such resources. See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 73, 1 78 (June
14).
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At this point, it may be useful to summarize and put in per-
spective the contribution to IEL we have been discussing. One
may state the different aspects of this contribution as follows: (i)
the general obligation of states to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
states or of areas beyond national control has become a norm of
customary international law; (ii) among the larger implications
of this general principle, one must note the need to take into
account environmental considerations when assessing what is
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military
objectives, when evaluating the occurrence of a state of necessity,
and possibly also when proceeding to an equitable delimitation
of a (maritime) boundary; and (iii) in the years to come, other
more specific rights and obligations may gain recognition as part
of customary international law, including duties of environmen-
tal impact assessment and monitoring of any substantial project
with potential implications for the environment. These latter is-
sues can also be seen as potential issues to be clarified by the
Court in the context of the two cases currently pending before it.
As discussed next, these cases may provide a rich basis for the
discussion of a number of both specific and more fundamental
issues relating to IEL.
IV. PROSPECTIVE ISSUES: A THIRD WAVE?
In order to understand the potential of the two aforemen-
tioned cases currently pending before the ICJ as a basis for the
development of IEL, it appears useful to provide a brief account
of the respective facts and the legal issues that may arise in this
context. This is, of course, a conjectural exercise to the extent
that the information available on these two cases is still very lim-
ited.
In the Pulp Mills case, Argentina claims, in essence, that by
authorizing the construction of two pulp mills on the banks of
the River Uruguay, in front the Argentine town of
Gualeguaychfi, Uruguay has engaged its international responsi-
bility to Argentina by reason of its violation of the Statute of the
River Uruguay of February 26, 1975 as well as of the other rules
of international law to which this Statute refers, including "the
obligation to take all necessary measures for the optimum and
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rational utilization of the River Uruguay,"76 a number of proce-
dural obligations such as that of prior notification to the Admin-
istrative Commission of the River Uruguay ("CARU"), the "obli-
gation to take all necessary measures to preserve the aquatic en-
vironment and prevent pollution and the obligation to protect
biodiversity and fisheries, including the obligation to prepare a
full and objective environmental impact study,"77 and "the obli-
gation to co-operate in the prevention of pollution and the pro-
tection of biodiversity and of fisheries."78 Both parties have re-
quested provisional measures, which the Court has rejected in
both instances. The potential of the arguments submitted so far
should, however, not to be underestimated. Indeed, in its appli-
cation for provisional relief Argentina observed that:
Article 41 (a) of the 1975 Statute imposed substantive obliga-
tions and created for Argentina at least two distinct rights:
first, "the right that Uruguay shall prevent pollution" and, sec-
ond, "the right to ensure that Uruguay prescribes measures
'in accordance with applicable international standards"'....
[And] that the substantive obligations under the Statute in-
cluded "Uruguay's obligation not to cause environmental pol-
lution or consequential economic losses, for example to tour-
ism."79
Argentina is therefore claiming, among other things, that the
1975 Statute incorporated international environmental stan-
dards, thus giving the opportunity to the Court to say what these
standards actually are, namely to specify at least part of their con-
tent. As discussed in the preceding section, this is an issue that
the second wave has left largely open.
At this preliminary stage of the procedure, the Court has
only noted, by reference to its Advisory Opinion on the Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
case, that it attaches great importance to the protection of the
environment."0 This is encouraging as a first step. One may,
however, read in the Court's reasoning a subtle preference for
76. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 4 (Summary of the Order of
July 13, 2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/11237.pdf (last vis-






narrowing the "applicable international standards" that it would
potentially have the task to analyze, and this by means of a
slightly limitative restatement of the substantive rights claimed
by Argentina."'
It goes without saying that there is no point in trying to
guess whether or not the Court will take the opportunity offered
by this case to further clarify the contents of IEL. What seems
sufficiently clear, even from the preliminary analysis so far con-
ducted, is that such opportunity does exist and could potentially
set the basis for an authoritative assessment not only of the con-
tents of (a number of) international environmental norms, but
also of their enforceability and even of the specific relations be-
tween environmental treaties and customary international law. 2
Thus, three main open questions could potentially be addressed
by the Court.
The second case currently pending, namely the Aerial Herbi-
cide case, also seems to have great potential as a basis for the
Court to clarify a number of open issues in IEL. The dispute, as
described in the application of Ecuador instituting proceedings
against Colombia, concerns:
Colombia's aerial spraying of toxic herbicides at locations
near, at and across its border with Ecuador. The spraying has
already caused serious damage to people, to crops, to ani-
mals, and to the natural environment on the Ecuadorian side
of the frontier, and poses a grave risk of further damage over
83time.
Ecuador further refers to the fact that the affected border re-
gion:
[I]s home to communities of indigenous peoples, including
the Awd, who continue to live according to their ancient tra-
ditions and are deeply dependant on their natural environ-
ment. Most of the population in the region lives in extreme
poverty and relies on subsistence farming of traditional crops
81. See id. 1 65, according to which, "Argentina claims that the substantive obliga-
tions the 1975 Statute imposes on Uruguay consist, first, of an obligation not to allow
any construction before the requirements of the 1975 Statute have been met; and, sec-
ond, of an obligation not to cause environmental pollution or consequential economic
and social harm, including losses to tourism." Id.
82. For a discussion of this issue, see Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relation-
ship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 901 (1999).
83. Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.) (Application of Mar. 31, 2008),
supra note 15, at 2.
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like yucca, corn, coffee and other foodstuffs to survive. As a
result, their connection to the land is deep. Infrastructure in
these areas is underdeveloped, healthcare is rudimentary and
formal education is minimal.
Ecuador is also one of just 17 countries in the world desig-
nated by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre of the
United Nations Environment Programme as "megadiverse."
Although it covers only 0.17% of the Earth's area, Ecuador
possesses a disproportionately large share of the world's bi-
odiversity ....
As a consequence, Colombia's fumigations are being con-
ducted in a particularly vulnerable area in a manner that dra-
matically heightens the risks involved to people and to the
natural environment.
8 4
Against this diverse background, Ecuador advances a very broad
claim, namely that Colombia has violated, "Ecuador's rights
under customary and conventional international law."
8s5
This seems therefore a very challenging and rich set of facts
for the Court to take the opportunity to clarify the contents and
enforceability of a number of customary norms of IEL. Moreo-
ver, the context in which the dispute arises, namely Colombia's
fight against drug growing and trafficking, and the important
implications of such context not only for Colombia but for many
other states as well, suggests that the Court may well be required
to elaborate on the hierarchy between different norms of inter-
national law.86 Colombia may well argue a state of necessity to
justify the measures taken. In such a hypothesis, the Court
would potentially be left with enough basis for evaluating com-
peting "essential interests,"87 one of them (Ecuador's) being of
an environmental nature.
84. Id. 1 24-26.
85. Id. 37.
86. On the hierarchy of the sources and/or norms of international law, see gener-
ally Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources in International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INr'L
L. 273 (1974-75); J.H.H. Weiler & Andreas L. Paulus, The Structure of Change in Interna-
tional Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 545
(1997); Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8 EUR. J. IT'L L.
566 (1997); Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of
Norms in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 583 (1997); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hier-
archy in International Law, 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 291 (2006).
87. See generally Ian Johnstone, The Plea of "Necessity" in International Legal Discourse:
Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337 (2005);
Daniel Dobos, The Necessity of Precaution: The Future of Ecological Necessity and the Precau-
tionary Principle, 13 FoRDHAm ENVrL. L. REv. 375 (2002); Roman Boed, State of Necessity
A CONTEMPORARY ASSESSMENT
Summing up, the issues that the Court could potentially ad-
dress on the basis of the Pulp Mills and Aerial Herbicide cases are,
in my view, the following: (i) contents (specific norms) of IEL,
(ii) enforceability of IEL, (iii) relations between treaty and cus-
tomary IEL, and (iv) hierarchy of part of IEL with respect to
other potentially essential interests. Such an agenda is probably
far too ambitious for one to expect that it will be fully addressed
by the Court, even assuming that all issues are raised in the par-
ties' submissions and that the disputes are not settled. The pur-
pose of our attempt at identifying them nevertheless is rather to
give an indication of some of the important issues that remain to
be (or could benefit from being further) clarified by the ICJ.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the preceding considerations, it is submitted
that a contemporary assessment of the ICJ's contribution to the
development of IEL yields in essence the following results.
First, the existence of a general obligation of states to en-
sure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect
the environment of other states as well as the environment of
areas beyond national control is now well grounded in custom-
ary international law. Second, it is consequently necessary to
take into account environmental considerations in other fields
of international law, for instance, with respect to the assessment
of what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legiti-
mate military objectives, or when evaluating whether a state can
avail itself of the state of necessity defense as a circumstance pre-
cluding the wrongfulness of a given action, or, still, when a tribu-
nal or a commission is called upon to effect an equitable delimi-
tation of a (maritime) boundary. Third, as discussed in Parts III
and IV above, the jurisprudence of the ICJ as well as a number of
opinions, particularly those of Judge Weeramantry, have raised
and may hopefully be expected to address several important is-
sues such as the existence of customary duties to assess and mon-
itor the environmental impact of large projects, the qualification
of environmental rights as human rights, the limits of the right
to economic development and, more fundamentally, the rela-
tions between treaty and customary law in the area of environ-




ment, or the specific contents and relative hierarchy of custom-
ary IEL.
This contribution may appear relatively modest in the light
of the numerous and far-reaching treaties and conventions that
have shaped the development of IEL, particularly since the
1970s.88 There are, in fact, very few fields of international law
that have experienced such a fast-paced progress as IEL.89 Such
an impression would, however, lose sight of what could be seen
as one the most important functions of the ICJ, namely one of
integration of specific sub-fields, such as IEL, into both the
broader context of general international law and its various
other sub-fields. Indeed, the main role of the ICJ with regard to
the development of international law is arguably not that of a
ground-breaking body but rather that of a stock-taking institu-
tion or, to put it in somewhat more colorful terms, that of being
the gate-keeper and guardian of general international law.
88. On the development of IEL after the 1970s, see Alexandre Kiss, Emergence des
principes genfaux du droit international et d 'une politique internationale de l'environnement, in
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL FACE A L'ETHIQUE ETA LA POLITIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 19-35
(Ivo Rens ed., 1996).
89. One may think, for instance, to the fields of international criminal law or inter-
national investment law, which despite their historical precedents in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, have only developed in the last two decades.
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